P2P Foundation

Researching, documenting and promoting peer to peer practices


Admin


Featured Book

Cloud Time


Open Calls


Mailing List

Subscribe

Translate

  • Recent Comments:

    • Anon: This is precisely why the OpenUDC project was started: http://openudc.org/

    • Matthew Slater: Amen! As I understand it, Bicoin consists of two separate mechanisms – the mining and the wallet system. The mining and the...

    • Charles van der Haegen: This is a great article, showing the divide that has been createdin society. How can this be seen by all the other...

    • David de Ugarte: Probably the most terrible fallacies of our times are: 1. «abundance equals ever increasing consumption» (neoliberal falacy) 2....

    • karirin: ABundance should exists but it must be applied in real world http://fr.ekopedia.org/Hydropo nie When there will be free food, in our world...

Archive for June, 2009

How Siefkes’ Peer Economy model differs from the market model

photo of Michel Bauwens

Michel Bauwens
30th June 2009


The following refers to Christian Siefkes book, From Exchange to Contributions: Generalizing Peer Production into the Physical World. (Edition C. Siefkes, Berlin, 2007), and the occasional critique that the proposed effort sharing scheme is in fact a market.

Christian Siefkes:

“Markets are based on private, uncoordinated production using privately owned means of production, whose output is afterwards exchanged.

In the peer economy model, production is not private but social from the very start: Since the tasks necessary to satisfy peoples wishes are shared (divided up), producers always know that they are meeting an existing need, that there will be somebody who will use their products.

In the peer economy model, resources and means of production are commons. They may be used by projects (i.e. they become possession–something that is used), but they are never privately owned by anybody: nobody has the right or the effective means to sell them or withhold them until the others fulfill one’s conditions. (Owners of resources and means of production have the means of backmail non-owners–that’s never the case in peer production.)

So these, I think, are the fundamental differences between markets and the commons-based peer economy: production is social from the very start since tasks are shared; and production is based on commons, not on private property.

There are, of course, other important differences such as that, in a peer economy, nobody would need to suffer hunger or other basic wants due to being unable to successfully sell anything. But these differences actually follow from the differences outlined above, between sharing tasks (where there is a bit to do for everybody) and selling/exchanging stuff, as well as between private, exclusion-based access to resources and means of production vs. common, inclusion-based access.”

Share

Posted in P2P Books, P2P Commons, P2P Economics, Peer Property (IP) | No Comments »

Thomas Greco on implementing regional mutual credit clearing associations

photo of Michel Bauwens

Michel Bauwens
30th June 2009


Reality Sandwich republishes an extensive excerpt from Thomas Greco excellent new book on monetary transformation, which we featured here before.

An excerpt from that larger excerpt, focused on how to implement bank-replacing ‘credit clearings’ on a regional level.

Thomas Greco:

“Doesn’t it therefore make more sense to nurture the businesses that are already part of the local economy? Doesn’t it make sense to support those companies that are locally owned or managed and have a stake in the prosper­ity and quality of life in their home communities? Communities that have a high quality of life, an able workforce, and a clean and pleasant environment do not need to offer bribes to outsiders. Relocalization efforts cannot get very far without the creation of metasystems that support buying locally, selling locally, investing locally, and saving locally. Conventional political forms of money, and huge banking companies that are owned and managed by remote entities, by their very nature militate against relocalization. There is no need for antagonistic opposition to those entities; they can be made less relevant and less destructive by implementing creative methods that localize control over both exchange and finance.

I propose that groups and organizations that seek to promote healthy, sustain­able local economies should make it a priority to organize regional mutual credit clearing associations as the centerpiece of a comprehensive program. As these associations develop and grow, they will provide their regions with an increasing measure of independence from the outside forces that control conventional money and banking, enabling communities to rise above “the race to the bottom” that has resulted from the kind of globalization that has been architected and forced upon the world by the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. The credit clearing exchange is the key element that enables a community to develop a sustainable economy under local control and to maintain a high standard of living and qual­ity of life.

The possibilities inherent in such a plan should not be judged by past expe­rience with local currencies and other exchange alternatives. Just as a modern jet aircraft bears little resemblance to the Wright brothers’ first airplane, so too are the more optimized exchange structures proposed in my book unlike any community currency, LETS, or commercial “barter” exchange with which people might be familiar. Based on the principles we have outlined, it is now possible to engineer and build exchange systems to carry heavy economic loads within local bioregions and to operate them according to sound busi­ness principles. This is a multistage project that will proceed in the following sequence:

1. Institute measures that promote import substitution.

2. Provide an alternative payment medium, independent of any political currency and banking establishment.

3. Issue a supplemental regional currency.

4. Develop basic support structures that strengthen the local economy and enhance the community’s quality of life.

5. Develop an independent value standard and unit of account. “

How to implement such a system?

Stage II: Mutual Credit Clearing Provides an Alternative Means of Payment

The second stage is the most important and unique stage of the project. It provides an alternative means of payment based on the community’s own credit through the process of direct credit clearing.

Working capital in the form of conventional money is always scarce and expensive for most businesses. Mutual credit clearing is an extension of the common business practice of selling on “open account,” but it is done on a more organized multilateral basis, which has the effect of sharing the risks and enabling a participant’s sales to pay for purchases without the use of any third-party credit instrument such as conventional money. As a member of a mutual credit clearing exchange, a business can have an interest-free line of credit, it will be able to acquire the things it needs without the use of cash, and (because it accepts payment in the form of exchange credit) will be a preferred source of supply for others who are members of the exchange.

The allocation of credit in a clearing exchange involves the granting of an “overdraft privilege,” which means that a member’s account may have a nega­tive balance up to some specified limit. In allocating lines of credit, it is impor­tant (especially in the beginning) to allocate the greatest share of credit to “trusted issuers” — i.e., those that are well established, financially sound, and whose products and services are in greatest demand within the local region. This is the key to maintaining a rapid circulation of credits through the system, avoiding defaults, and preventing the excessive accumulation of credits in the hands of businesses that cannot easily spend them. In brief, the businesses that you wish to have accept community credits in payment are the ones that should be issuing them in the first place. By beginning with “trusted issuers” the value and usefulness of the community credits is quickly demonstrated beyond any doubt. As the process gains credibility and general acceptance in the community, more businesses and individuals will want to join the credit clearing exchange and as each member develops a trading history they too can earn an overdraft privilege commensurate with their volume of sales within the system.

Like any network, a credit clearing system becomes more valuable and useful as it continues to expand and a greater variety of goods and services become available within the network. By way of example one may note that the first fax machine was very expensive — but useless. As more fax machines were deployed and connected in an expanding network, the fax became more valuable to all users — even as prices plummeted and quality improved. The same will happen with clearing networks, but it is essential that the network and each node in it be properly designed and operated from the very start.

Stage III: The Credit of “Trusted Issuers” Provides an Alternative Currency for Regional Circulation

The third stage of the program will be the joint issuance of credits into the general community by the members of the clearing association. This is accom­plished by the association members buying goods and services from nonmem­bers who are outside the credit clearing circle. They make these purchases by using some form of uniform credit instrument, like a voucher or certificate, which all association members are obliged to redeem — not for cash, but for the goods and services that are their normal stock in trade. That provides a sound regional currency based on the productive capacity of the region’s leading enterprises, a currency that can circulate among any and all as a supplemental medium of exchange. The availability of such a currency to supplement the flow of official money insulates but does not isolate the local economy. Just as a breakwater protects a small boat harbor from the turbulence of the open sea, a sound regional currency provides a measure of protection from the turbu­lence of the global economy and centralized banking and finance.

This externalization of credits from the clearing association into the general community can be achieved using any of several available forms and devices. Credits may take the form of paper notes, coupons, vouchers, or certificates; they might be placed on stored value cards like the gift cards that are commonly issued by major retailers and are so popular these days with consumers; or they could manifest as credits in accounts that reside on a central server that can be accessed by use of a debit card and point-of-sale card reader.”

Share

Posted in P2P Money | 1 Comment »

Bre Pettis on Rapid Prototyping

photo of Michel Bauwens

Michel Bauwens
30th June 2009


Enthusiastic presentation on the joys of do it yourself production:

Share

Posted in P2P Manufacturing, Video | No Comments »

Wim Nusselder on Quarternary Economics

photo of Michel Bauwens

Michel Bauwens
29th June 2009


A repost from January 2006:

We recommend the reading of Wim Nusselder’s vision of the evolution of economics towards a quarternary stage. We summarize his views, give excerpts,and offer some addtional commentary at the bottom of this entry.

This is an economics based on Robert Pirsig’s Metaphysics of Quality (Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, Lila). It’s fourth section contains an interesting account of economic development, towards a ‘quarternary economics’. I believe it fits in with P2P theory, which is also about value-based production (in the sense of associating with people with similar values, in order to create new types of use value). Next week, I will discuss the differences in approach, but here I focus on the elements of convergence.

Here’s my 1) own short summary, 2) followed by the extensive quote, and.3) some commentary about ‘Value and P2P’; 4) a graph which attempts to fuse my own understanding, the fourfold intersubjective typology of Alan Page Fiske and the ‘type of dependence’ typology of Wim Nusselder

The primary economy is based on reciprocity, which derives from common ancestry or lineage. It is based on families, clans, tribes and exchange mostly operates through gifts which create further obligation. The division of labour is minimal and most often related to gender and age. The key question is ‘to belong or not to belong’. Social groups are based and bounded by real or symbolic lineage. Wants are defined by the community. Leadership is in the hands of the lineage leadership. Power is associated with a natural order (man are physically stronger, older people are wiser, etc.., some people are blessed by the gods,…) which cannot be challenged.

The secondary economy arises together with power monopolies which engender coercion as a means to force cooperation. We enter the domain of class societies, and production is organized by the elite in power, which holds together through the symbolic power which transforms power into allegiance. Respect for power, in the form of tribute, taxes, etc.. is normative. Distribution depends on your place in this chain of symbolic power. Wants are defined by the symbolic power with symbolic markers monopolized. The key question is: ‘to deserve power or to deserve subjection’. Social groups are bound by allegiance to power. Leadership is political and religious.

The tertiary economy arises with the entrepreneur and capitalism. It is based on ‘equivalent’, i.e. ‘fair’ exchange, which is normative. Power arises from relative productivity, relative monopoly over a needed good, and from the wage relationship, all of which create dependence. Social groups are loose, and wants are determined by advertising and mimetic desire. Cooperation is no longer correlated to belonging.

The quarternary economy is based on ‘ideological leaders’ which can frame common goals and common belonging and is based on membership and contribution. Contributing to the best of one’s ability to common goals is normative and the key question becomes: to follow an existing group or to create one’s own, i.e. to convince or be convinced. Contributions to many groups can overlap making the decision over wants a more autonomous process. Power is dependent on the power to convince, on influence, and varies depending on one’s relative place in the different groups.

– Excerpts from Wim Nusselder:

“For most of human history political economy has been the exclusive domain of political and religious leaders. A basic fact of economics is, that almost anything people want can be got more easily if (more) people co-operate. (More co-operation does not imply larger scale organizations! The best way of getting a lot of things is organizing people in a lot of small scale organizations that are usually self-sufficient, but that collectively back up each other if need be.) Leaders organize co-operation. A leader tells or shows people what they want and how to get it, if … they co-operate in a specified way. For most of human history being member of the same society meant following the same leadership.

The oldest form of economy is organized around (real or symbolic) family relationships. Genealogy provides meaning. To belong or not to belong, that is the question. Reciprocity is normative. You help someone else who needs help because you are related. Receiving help strengthens the relationship and enhances the obligation to do something in return in the future. Leadership often correlates with age and a male gender role, because it requires building a web of reciprocal relations with oneself as the ‘spider in the web’. Older males are in most societies in the best position to do (or have done) so.
The defining characteristics of such primary societies (e.g. nuclear families) is that there is supposed to be no choice whether one ‘belongs’ or ‘doesn’t belong’ to a society. ‘Given’ characteristics decide who ‘belongs’ and who is to be excluded from the benefits of ‘belonging’. These benefits include access to communal resources and sharing in the results of pooled labour. Pooling labour and allotting roles, primarily according to age and gender, allows for (limited) division of labor, specialization, economies of scale and satisfying some wants that can hardly be satisfied alone (like hunting mammoths). Primary economy can consist (simultaneously) of families (all living relatives), clans (people whose ancestry can be traced to the same remembered ancestor), tribes (people who trace their ancestry back to the same symbolic or mythological/legendary ancestor), nations (people who deduce from common history, language etc. that they must have common ancestry) and theoretically even of humanity as a whole.

A second form of economy originates (in addition to the primary form, not necessarily instead) wherever leaders enlarge their influence beyond those who automatically ‘belong’. They do so by monopolizing some kind of power. This power can be of different types. It can be magical, the ability of shamans to manipulate fear for that which is not understood. It can be military, based on weapon technology and on the ability to mobilize and organize people against other people. It can also be democratic, based on the convention to let a popularity contest determine who gets for a couple of years the law enforced right to tell others what to do (within restrictions). Coercive relations are added to family (like) relations. Additional meaning is provided by supposed virtues like ‘nobility’, ‘culture’ (in a strict sense) and ‘civilization’. To deserve power or to deserve subjection, that is the question. Enlarging society by those in power by coercing extra subjects into cooperating allows for the pooling of more resources, more division of labour, specialization, economies of scale etc. The norm is ‘fair’ distribution of the costs (e.g. by taxes) and benefits of enlarging society, i.e. distribution in proportion to virtue. Leaders recruit the resources needed to exercise power (and mostly so from those who ‘deserve’ to be taxed heaviest). They use -wherever possible- the benefits of their exercise of power to consolidate their position by maintaining and enhancing their power. That requires giving their subjects what they want, at least those they depend on for their power. The defining characteristic of this second form of economy compared to the first form is the enforcement of social boundaries (however they are defined: geographical, ethnical etc.). ‘Secondary societies’ can also have different sizes. Because of the need of leaders to monopolize power in order to stabilize their position, the coexistence of several overlapping secondary societies is never stable however. It is most stable if the size of coexisting secondary societies is clearly different (e.g. local and national) and if the type of power their leaders exercise is clearly different (e.g. religious versus military).

The third form of economy is added by a new type of leader (not political or religious any more): the entrepreneur. It is organized with exchange relationships. Productivity provides additional meaning. To produce (value for others that entitles you to remuneration) or to depend (on others for your livelihood) that is the question. Fair dealing (equivalent exchange) is normative. The defining characteristic of this third form of economy compared to the second form is, that an economic leader, an entrepreneur, does not (pretend to) lead (and organize the satisfaction of wants for) a society as a whole. The boundaries of the social group that is led by an entrepreneur are not clear-cut. That group normally consists of employees, but it can also contain suppliers, customers or others that enter into exchange relationships with the enterprise. Strong economic leaders make others dependent on what they produce (or on the income they provide by buying other people’s labor or products). It is the inequality of the mutual dependence of exchange partners that determines relative power over what the other can get and thus the limits of what he/she will want. An enterprise that is the only source of employment in a region or almost the only producer or buyer of a particular type of goods or services has a lot of power over the wants of its (potential) employees, customers or suppliers. Additional ways in which an entrepreneur can make others want what he/she wants them to want are advertising and standardization, among others. ‘Tertiary societies’ contain a lot of overlapping and complementary groups organized by different economic leaders. The boundary of such a group lies between those who are dependent but only for a few wants and those who are not dependent at all on their leader. With the rise of tertiary societies political economy is not the exclusive domain of political and religious leaders any more. ‘Tertiary economies’ can pool even more resources, enable more division of labour, specialization, economies of scale etc. than secondary ones, because co-operation doesn’t depend on the ability to feel a sense of ‘belonging together’ with those one co-operates with anymore.

The fourth type of economy is organized by ideological leaders. It is organized with relations of membership and contribution. Common goals and common interests provide additional meaning. To convince (others that your way of reaching goals or serving interests is the best way) or to follow others, that is the question. Contributing to the best of one’s ability to common goals and interests is normative. The defining characteristic of this fourth form of economy compared to the earlier forms is the voluntary choice to ‘belong’ or ‘not to belong’. Ideological leaders make their followers identify with their group by convincing them. ‘Belonging’ or ‘not belonging’ to groups depends on the strength of identification with their common goals and shared interests. ‘Quaternary societies’ contain even more overlapping and complementary groups. ‘Belonging’ to different groups at the same time is enabled by complex, multi-layered identities. Boundaries are even less clear-cut. They can be determined by asking whether someone contributes or not to the common goals and shared interests, however little.
‘Quaternary economies’ can pool even more resources, enable more division of labour, specialization, economies of scale etc. than tertiary ones, because people can participate in several different roles at the same time. One can be a specialist in one field and in other fields a layman, who can only follow what others propose to contribute to reaching common goals and serve shared interests. Our present economy is of course a mix of all these forms.”

- Commentary: what can we say about value, P2P and the new process of socialization/recognition ?

The above has motivated me to think about ‘value’ in P2P’, here are some very preliminary ideas.

First of all, P2P is geared to the production of use value, without going through the intermediary of producing exchange value for a marketplace. This relates to the kind of value as discussed in economics.

But what about the value as we understand it in the ethical sphere? There are different ways to frame this. As explained above by Nusselder, the very choice of a P2P project to collaborate on, is determined by the fit between common values and personal values. Once we adhere and contribute to a project, we derive ‘value’, i.e. a more meaningfull life, from it. This value is also expressed in a more or less objective way, i.e. the proven use value interacts with the personal value that can be derived from it, and which is basically the match between the common and the singular, the collective and the individual. Two criteria are important:

- the relative success of the project in the overall ‘marketplace’ of P2P projects. Is the resulting use value used or not, and to what extent? This kind of value translates in the relative reputation and recognition of the project as such, and the participating individuals partake in it

- one’s relative contribution to the project itself, eventually measured through social accounting tools, adjudicates ‘reputation’ and ‘recognition’ within the project

- both aspects will be associated when the internal reputation translates in an assocation between the persons involved, and the project

This is the Wisdom Game to which I refer to in my manuscript (the concept was inspired by Shumpei Kumon); it is of great importance since in a P2P environment, social recognition is no longer derived from physical power, from financial power, but precisely from this kind of reputation.

Share

Posted in P2P Economics, P2P Theory | 8 Comments »

Evolving images of the divine and increased human cooperation

photo of Michel Bauwens

Michel Bauwens
29th June 2009


Certainly a book that will be on my reading list: Robert Wright. The Evolution of God.

The following is an excerpt from a review by Dan Cryer in the Boston Globe:

“Wright assumes from the outset that religions change. And the most trustworthy means of explaining why is to trust “the facts on the ground’’ – that is, the economic-social-political context. In the final analysis, he emerges as an optimistic materialist. For he concludes that change will eventually tilt toward a more benign global religious environment. Now before you can shout “9/11’’ or “jihad,’’ listen to his argument.

The author traces the growth of gods from the animism of hunter-gatherers (where spirits rule over natural phenomena) to the polytheism of chiefdoms and ancient states (where multiple gods govern every aspect of life). These gods are hardly paragons of right living; they are capricious and often cruel. Over millennia, these models give way to a hierarchy of gods, with a powerful sovereign in charge, and, later yet, to monolatry, in which a city-state or nation bows to a single god considered superior to all others.

Most of the book, however, is devoted to the evolution of God concepts within more familiar precincts of monotheism: the Hebrew and Christian Bibles and the Koran. In the archeology and textual criticism of modern scholars, which Wright cites, these scriptures seldom appear in chronological order. Read in the proper sequence, however, they reveal a record of change.

Much like Jack Miles’s “God: A Biography,’’ Wright’s narrative shows a “Yahweh’’ alternatively compassionate or vengeful, mercurial or wise. The God of the Hebrews takes a while to differentiate from the El of the Canaanites and the Baal of the Phoenicians. In doing so, his story gradually sheds remnants of polytheism; the god Pestilence, for instance, becomes mere pestilence. Under Persian influence, Abrahamic monotheism eventually shifts “from a nationalistic and exclusive theology’’ to “a more international and inclusive one.’’

In short, the Hebrew God shakes off his adolescent belligerence and assumes a kinder, gentler persona. While regarding the Jews as his favorite, this God presides benevolently over all the world’s people.

Wright charts a similar evolution in the chapters grouped under the title “The Invention of Christianity.’’ Mark, the earliest Gospel, is surprisingly devoid of the New Testament’s supposed hallmark, love. There are no beatitudes, no turning of the other cheek, no “love your enemy.’’ The neighbor you are obliged to love is defined narrowly, most likely one of your fellow followers of Jesus. Not until Matthew and Luke is love enlarged; the Good Samaritan does not appear until the last of the Gospels, Luke.

It was under St. Paul’s charismatic leadership that the fledgling Jesus movement was transformed into a vehicle of interethnic brotherly love. Wright’s description of Paul as an entrepreneur brilliant at expanding his Jesus “brand’’ throughout the polyglot Roman Empire may put off some Christians, but it provides a convincing account of why early Christianity was able to succeed among a Babel of competing deities.

Can we all live together in peace? Over history’s long haul, Wright believes we can. In the meantime, believers need to feel themselves not in a zero-sum game but a win-win situation. That’s when scriptural bases for tolerance trump those counseling belligerence.”

Share

Posted in P2P Books, P2P Spirituality | No Comments »

Fairthlough on the 3 forms of organizational power

photo of Michel Bauwens

Michel Bauwens
28th June 2009


This is a repost from January 2006:

In my presentations on the emergence of the peer to peer mode of production, governance, and property, I always insist on the difference between decentralized and distributed systems, with P2P applying to the latter.

This differentiation is echoed in the theory of Triarchy, which makes the interesting distinction between three modes of power. Combined with the decentralized/distributed systems distinction this gives an interesting correspondence:

If hierarchy is the power system of centralized systems, then heterarchical power is the power system of decentralized systems and Responsible Autonomy is the power system of distributed systems.

This distinction is derived from the work on ‘triarchy’, distinguishing three forms of rule and governance,by Gerard Fairtlough, former CEO of Shell Chemicals UK and founder of biotech firm Celltech.

“there are three ways of getting things done in organizations and the combination of the three is called triarchy, which means triple rule. The Three Ways of Getting Things Done: Hierarchy, Heterarchy and Responsible Autonomy in Organizations.When I was young I thought hierarchy was the only way to run organizations. Although in those days I’d barely heard of the great sociologist Max Weber, I unknowingly shared his belief that an organization couldn’t exist without a hierarchical chain of authority. Now, after over fifty years working in organizations of many different kinds, I’ve come to realise there are two other, equally important, ways of getting things done and that it’s vital for us to understand these other ways. We also need to understand why hierarchy always seems to trump the others.” (source: www.triarchypress.co.uk/pages/triarchy.htm)

Next to hierarchy, Fairtlough distinguishes:

“heterarchy” and “responsible autonomy”. ”’Heterarchical systems share power”’–for example, a board that votes to decide issues, or different branches of government that have checks and balances through separation and overlap of power. ”’Responsible autonomy is purer self-organization”’–i.e. it has no inherent structure. It distinguishes itself from anarchy by holding decision-makers responsible for the outcomes of their decisions.

Share

Posted in P2P Governance | No Comments »

The seven errors of government

photo of Michel Bauwens

Michel Bauwens
27th June 2009


Summary of an interesting blogpost by Dave Snowden, summarized by David Gurteen:

“1. You get what you measure, so if you set a target humans will achieve the target at all costs, ignoring context or the unstated goals that the outcome based target was attempting to achieve.

2. Outcome based measurement can make people far too comfortable. It’s all to easy to achieve an explicit target, especially if you can turn off an empathy (or at least suppress it).

3. A mechanical approach is by its nature dehumanising in its effect on people and inhuman in its impact on society.

4. You waste an awful amount of resource just managing the measurement system.

5. We try and solve issues with idealistic, “fail-safe”, designs rather than allowing systems to evolve.

6. Re-organisation is a disease and an excuse. It’s the knee jerk reaction to any failure that ends up breaking your jaw with the recoil.

7. Communication is all up and down the chain, ironically this mediates information to senior decision makers so they are immunised from the real data they need, and also from the consequences of their actions.

He also makes the point that this all comes back to?one fundamental error, namely we are treating all the processes of government as if they were tasks for engineers rather than a complex problem of co-evolution at multiple levels (individuals, the community, the environment etc.).”

Share

Posted in Collective Intelligence, P2P Business Models, P2P Public Policy | No Comments »

Non-dualistic change dynamics

photo of Michel Bauwens

Michel Bauwens
26th June 2009


Decreasing your reliance on a preconceived end or means of getting there can offer a new point of departure for new possibilities that were not previously available. To me, this applies as much to individuals in their personal lives as much as it does to people in organisations.

Interesting meditation on change dynamics, by Stephen Billing:

“It is common for many people to see the world as an ideal contrasted with a reality. People are measured against an ideal standard and are diagnosed in relation to that standard. The gap analysis is the classic example – where do you want to be compared to where you are now. There is a deficit and the solution is to work out a plan to close the gap.

Patricia Benner in The Primacy of Caring points out that this orientation towards some future ideal state has some cost. The price people pay for having this mindset is that they become blinded to the possibilities in their current situation. Because their focus is on the future and the gap, it is not on what is going on around them at the present moment.

This reminds me of the acres of diamonds story – I think I heard it from Brian Tracy and it may well be apocryphal. It concerns a farmer who sold up his farm and went off to another country to hunt for diamonds. Years later, he died, penniless and alone. In the meantime, on his farm that he had sold years earlier, guess what they found? Some very very large diamonds.

I think that the focus on an ideal future and the deficit compared to the current state stops people in organisations from seeing the possibilities in what is going on around them. It stops them from seeing the acres of diamonds that are present right now.

In your organisation where are the areas in which you are talking about what should be in the future at the expense of noticing what is going on around you at this very moment?”

Share

Posted in P2P Subjectivity, P2P Technology, P2P Theory | 1 Comment »

The crisis of value and the death of classic TV

photo of Michel Bauwens

Michel Bauwens
25th June 2009


In a brilliant analysis of a rapidly growing crisis for TV stations, Henry Blodget writes:

As with print-based media, Internet-based distribution generates only a tiny fraction of the revenue and profit that today’s incumbent cable, broadcast, and satellite distribution models do. As Internet-based distribution gains steam, therefore, most TV industry incumbents will no longer be able to support their existing cost structures.

He writes that:

“TV business models for the past half-century, from broadcast to cable to satellite, have been built on the following foundation:

* Not much else to do at home that’s as simple and fun as TV
* No way to get video content other than via TV
* No options other than TV for advertisers who want to tell video stories
* No options other than cable–and, more recently, satellite–to get TV
* Tight choke-points in each market through which all video content has to flow (cable company, airwaves), which creates enormous value for the owners of those gates.”

And why is this changing:

“* Other simple and fun options emerging at home: Internet, video games, Facebook, IM, DVDs

* New ways to get TV content other than traditional TV companies: Hulu, YouTube, iTunes, Netflix

* Video-story options for advertisers beginning to emerge: Hulu shows, for example (But NBC, et al, making a lot less per viewer now than they do on TV)

* More options for getting video content: telcos, cable cos, wireless cos (soon)

* Fewer choke points in each market: With an Internet connection anywhere in the world, you will soon be able to get to almost anything. And not just to your computer–to your television.”

He then outlines all the wrong things TV moguls are trying to implement to stave off the inevitable (see the full article for a full overview!).

In the end …

“You won’t have 5 channels, or 50 channels, or 500 channels. You’ll have millions of channels. You’ll be able to watch anything you want, live or taped. You’ll be able to watch it wherever you want–TV, computer, mobile device. You won’t have to sorry about “slinging” video content around or programming your DVR. You’ll just plug a pipe (Internet) into a box (device) and watch. This is where the future is going. That’s obvious. The only question is how long it takes us to get there–and who gets killed along the way.”

“When will this happen? Over the next 5-10 years. And it will leave today’s TV industry looking like today’s newspaper industry.”

Share

Posted in Social Media | No Comments »

Wikipedia and the typology of online tribal governance

photo of Michel Bauwens

Michel Bauwens
25th June 2009


There is a really good review of Mathieu O’Neill’s Cyberchiefs book. We covered that important book before, but are here excerpting the interesting typology of governance used by the author. This is followed by a summary of the case study on Wikipedia where this framework is applied.

From the review:

“The flowering of freedom is indeed an important part of the Internet’s impact, but this emphasis on freedom obscures the ways that traditional forms of power, privilege and domination carry over to the online world. Early students of online sociology described the web as inherently anti-authoritarian (primarily because of its technical structure, an open network). O’Neil shows that concepts of authority and power developed by social theorists can apply to both the web in general and to specific online tribes—a term he uses to indicate that the social and political structures of online communities are largely independent of nation-states.

Adapting Max Weber’s tripartite classification of authority, O’Neil identifies three forms of authority that structure the social environment of online tribes:

Hacker-charisma authority is deference given to leaders who put their extraordinary talents to work for the communities they lead.

Index-charisma authority comes from having many connections and being well-known.

Sovereign authority consists of rules and laws; individuals may wield sovereign authority, but ultimately authority of this type inheres in the community-accepted rules themselves.

1. Hacker-charisma authority – a form of charismatic authority rooted in respect for broadly-construed “hacking” ability—the special talents and skills that are relevant to the goals of a particular tribe. The canonical example of this type of authority is project leadership in free software development communities, where those with acknowledged coding ability and an intimate understanding of a particular software system are deferred to by other programmers. In Wikipedia, hacker-charisma authority is the un-codified respect given to editors who are good at what they do (whether article writing, copy-editing, identifying sockpuppets, scripting, or some other task).

2. Index-charisma authority – another form of charismatic authority, based on concepts from network theory such as centrality and preferential attachment. In a social network, having links to many others and/or very important others is itself a type of authority, in the form of a large audience; just as highly linked sites are the top results in search engines and thus attract more links, well-connected members of online tribes (especially early adopters) have index-charisma authority from being well-known. This is most obvious in Wikipedia in terms of the rising standards of adminship (which means it was much easier for early editors to become administrators), but it works in subtler ways as well—as when, upon joining large discussions, we look first to familiar and respected users.

3. Sovereign authority – the analog of Weber’s rational authority, which is based on norms, rules and laws (including, in the online context, laws programmed into the system). On Wikipedia, sovereign authority is invoked whenever editors use guidelines and policy to justify their actions or point out violations. The various classes of privileged editors—rollbackers, administrators, bureaucrats, etc.—embody sovereign authority, and are expected to act as enforcers of the community-created rules rather than powers unto themselves.

In addition to these forms of potentially legitimate authority, O’Neil shows that vestiges of power, privilege and symbolic violence from the broader culture, what he terms archaic force, have a dramatic impact on the web’s social landscape. For example, in principle blogging is a way for anyone—no matter how qualified or unqualified, powerful or marginal—to reach a wide audience and make him or herself heard. But in practice the “A-list” bloggers that do reach large audiences are overwhelmingly social elites; “they are not only white, male and middle-class,” writes O’Neil, “they are also highly educated, placing them effectively higher on the social ladder than the ‘elite’ mainstream journalists whose power they are supposed to be contesting.”

This type of pattern—those with the training and free time afforded by social privilege rise to the top—is also apparent in free software communities and on Wikipedia and other seemingly egalitarian online knowledge projects. O’Neil sees at work here “the heart of social domination [which is] making the socially constructed appear natural.”

Archaic force also manifests itself in received netiquette conventions and patterns of online discourse that encourage symbolic violence. Flaming and trolling are the purest expressions of archaic force; the flaming and trolling of newcomers and others who do not conform to community norms is a way of asserting power. O’Neil writes that “In general women have a deep aversion towards the kinds of adversarial exchange that men thrive on”, and argues that early netiquette specifically encouraged male styles of adversarial discussion, even flaming, about intellectual and ideological matters but discouraged discussion of personal matters. (We see the legacy of such netiquette on Wikipedia, where aggressive discussion is acceptable but personalizing disputes is forbidden; whether O’Neil would consider this an archaic residue of sexism is unclear, but at least one scholar of wiki communities has argued that Wikipedia-like projects have an inherent gender bias.)”

Tribal authority on Wikipedia

“In the book’s final case study, O’Neil examines how authority works on Wikipedia. Wikipedia governance relies primarily on charismatic authority—users deferred to because of their reputations, as talented contributors (hacker-charisma) and/or long-standing and dedicated active community members (index-charisma)—and popular sovereign authority—community-created rules and norms.
Is the surveillance-centered social and technical structure of Wikipedia like the street culture of a close-knit neighborhood or the discipline-minded watchmen of the Panopticon?

“Can people pull rank in a rankless universe”, he asks? The answer, of course, is yes; things like rollback rights, adminship, checkuser, and even—perhaps especially—edit count can serve as markers of authority in a social system based on constant surveillance of everyone’s actions by everyone else. (In The Wikipedia Revolution, Andrew Lih compared Wikipedia to the benign street culture praised by urbanist Jane Jacobs: cities are safe when they are always under the watchful eye of residents. Others invoke a more sinister metaphor, likening Wikipedia to the Panopticon prison in which inmates never know whether they are being watched and so must behave as if they are.)

It is when surveillance breaks down that authority becomes a problem in the Wikipedia community. The Essjay controversy is the best known example of this; while claiming (falsely) to be a professor of theology, editor Essjay at times touted his supposed credentials in content disputes.

But the most significant section focuses on what O’Neil terms “the Durova dust-up”, the incident in which User:Durova briefly blocked User:!! as a sockpuppet based on an investigation that was not transparent to community surveillance (which led to Durova resigning her adminship). Here the dangers of both too much and too little surveillance were at work. O’Neil explains that “the incident resonated deeply with many editors, because it commingled authority and secrecy.” The affront to the project’s core value of openness and transparency was matched by “an equally powerful, and opposite, feeling: that some admins had been the victim of harassment and stalking because of their work for the project; that these experiences were frightening and painful; and that most of the victims were female.”

[Clarification: O'Neil does not discuss specific instances of harassment, but refers in the preceding quote to the broader context of harassment as part of the spectrum of disruptive action, which efforts like "sock hunting" are employed to prevent.]

Charismatic and sovereign authority predominate, but archaic force is not altogether absent from Wikipedia. O’Neil singles out a Jimmy Wales quote from a 2006 New Yorker article (the one at the center of the Essjay controversy) to show how offline injustice and inequality is reinscribed in Wikipedia: “If it isn’t on Google, it doesn’t exist”, said Wales. (O’Neil offers a wider discussion of Wikipedia in his recent essay from Le Monde diplomatique, “Wikipedia: experts are us”.)

Historical factors and offline injustices—sexism, economic inequality, political geography—can clearly tilt the scales in online tribes. There are (at least so far) no online Utopias. The question for Wikipedia is, how deep is the shadow of history? How set in stone is Wikipedia’s community culture, crafted as it has been by the earliest members with their peculiar outlooks and inclinations? Through the mechanism of preferential attachment in article creation and expansion and the propagation of charismatic authority, will Wikipedia always retain the mark of the early community’s interests and prejudices?

O’Neil’s particular analysis of Wikipedia includes some worthwhile points (and some errors and misinterpretations), but the case study only breaks the surface of the authority issue. The concepts of archaic force and the three modes of online authority are useful concepts for thinking about the community; Wikipedia authority is heterogeneous, sometimes with charismatic authority most important, sometimes with sovereign authority, and in our worst moments with archaic force deciding things.”

Share

Posted in P2P Books, P2P Governance, P2P Hierarchy Theory | No Comments »